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Speechlessness and Trauma: Why the 





“The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical 
and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and 
witnesses.” 
—Rome Statute, article 68(1) 
 
“The ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them from consciousness. 
Certain violations of the social compact are too terrible to utter aloud: this 
is the meaning of the word unspeakable.” 
—JUDITH HERMAN, M.D., TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE 
AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL 
TERROR 1 (1997). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Trauma is a narrative fracture. Psychologically, a traumatic event is defined by its 
inability to fit within one’s linear meaning structure. Neuroscience teaches that memories 
of traumatic events are even stored in a different part of the brain from regular, narrative 
memories. This article looks at how the narrative fracture of trauma influences 
interviewers, interviewees, and the judicial process at the International Criminal Court 
(the Court or the ICC). Since interviewing techniques can have positive and negative 
effects on both the speaker and the listener, this article argues that the ICC has, at the 
very least, a duty under the Rome System1 to prevent the negative effects of interviewing 
to the extent possible within its resources. It concludes by suggesting ways to start that 
process. 
                                                 
*
 Candidate for J.D. and LL.M. in International Human Rights, Northwestern University School of Law, 
2014.  With thanks to David Scheffer, Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and Director of 
the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern Law, and to my supervisors at the International 
Criminal Court who deepened my understanding of the issues raised in this article, Didier Preira, Ira 
Goldberg, and Cyril Laucci, and to the individuals who allowed me to interview them for this piece, Fiona 
MacKay, An Michels, Michaela Bauer, and Vedrana Mladina. The views expressed herein, as well as all 
errors and omissions, are my own. 
1
 “Rome System” refers to the statutory and regulatory documents of the Court, Counsel, and the Trust 
Fund for Victims.  These include the Rome Statute (ICCSt), the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(RPE), the Regulations of each of the Organs, and any other documents that have binding effect on 
operations of the respective entity. 
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¶2  Much of the recent discussion of victim participation revolves around 
intermediaries.2 Intermediaries are individuals and/or groups on the ground in situation 
countries that are relied upon by multiple organs and units of the Court and counsel for 
various reasons. After all, the Court cannot be everywhere at once with its limited 
resources. The Court also cannot know all of the local customs, languages, and slang. 
Intermediaries solve these and other problems.3 
¶3  Anyone can be an intermediary; no standard training is required—or, generally, 
offered.4 Intermediaries can be friends or family members of victims, or they can be 
“post-conflict justice junkies”5 or local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are 
“devoted to promoting post-conflict justice.”6 States themselves can even be 
intermediaries.7 Sometimes the Court has the ability to choose the intermediary, and 
sometimes it doesn’t, i.e., when a victim says he will only communicate with the Court 
through a particular interlocutor. 
¶4  Many intermediary tasks involve talking directly with victims, but intermediaries 
often do not know how to do so. That knowledge is important because appropriate 
interviewing techniques have been shown to decrease victims’ Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) symptoms and to decrease the likelihood of both victim 
retraumatization and interviewer vicarious traumatization. Conversely, improper 
interviewing techniques have been shown to increase PTSD symptoms and cause 
retraumatization and vicarious traumatization. 
¶5  Right now, victims are suffering as a result of the work of the Court. Their harm is 
sometimes caused by negative experiences in interviews either during investigations or at 
trial.  Other times, it is caused by the procedural reality that a victim’s status, and 
therefore a victim’s rights, may shift throughout trial. When a victim’s rights shift and 
they are no longer involved in proceedings, an interview may form the bulk of their 
interaction with the Court. Some studies show that victims judge the justice they receive 
more by their treatment during the trial than by the trial’s outcome. Under this theory, 
better interviewing would result in both less suffering and more perceived justice. 
¶6  Intermediaries are also suffering because they do not know how to talk to victims. 
Two NGOs that regularly work with the Court, the International Refugee Rights Initiative 
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., Caroline Buisman, Delegating Investigations: Lessons to be Learned from the Lubanga 
Judgment, 11 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 30 (2013). 
3
 See Holly Dranginis, The Middle Man: The Intermediaries of International Criminal Justice, JUSTICE IN 
CONFLICT (Aug. 21, 2011), http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/ 
08/21/the-middle-man-the-intermediaries-of-international-criminal-justice/. 
4
 The author has personal knowledge that when a training program for intermediaries from a particular 
situation was held at the seat of the Court, there was no training on how to talk with victims because the 
organizer was not aware that such training existed or was possible.  The author was informed that the 
organizer would not have hesitated to arrange that training had the organizer known about it. 
5
 Elena Baylis, Tribunal Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 361, 364 
(2008). 
6
 Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 121, 126 (2009). 
7
 ICC, Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, Regulation 67, ICC-ASP/4/Res.3 (Dec. 3, 2005) (“The 
Trust Fund may decide to use intermediaries to facilitate the disbursement of reparations awards, as 
necessary, where to do so would provide greater access to the beneficiary group and would not create any 
conflict of interest. Intermediaries may include interested States, intergovernmental organizations, as well 
as national or international nongovernmental organizations working in close proximity with the beneficiary 
groups.”). 
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(IRRI) and the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), have written that their 
intermediaries have “suffered deep trauma as a result of [their work for the court].”8 They 
specifically asked for training “in techniques relating to approaching and handling 
potential witnesses.”9 IRRI and OSJI are not alone in their cries for help, but that help has 
not been forthcoming. 
¶7  The Court is currently in the process of promulgating guidelines governing 
relations between the Court and intermediaries (the Guidelines).10 The author worked on 
these guidelines during his time at the Court in Spring 2012. The Guidelines are largely a 
response to the problems that arose in the Prosecution’s use of intermediaries in Lubanga. 
As such, the Guidelines rightly cover many fundamental issues, e.g., the definition of 
intermediaries and the legal and policy framework governing utilization of 
intermediaries. But the Guidelines do not mention prophylactic psychosocial measures 
designed to protect intermediaries and victims from unintended trauma.11   
¶8  The number of victims involved in proceedings is only increasing,12 so knowing 
how to talk to victims on behalf of the Court is becoming a bigger issue by the day. This 
paper advocates specifically for the adoption of interviewing guidelines for all 
individuals interacting with traumatized individuals for and on behalf of the Court. A 
failure to promulgate interviewing guidelines at this crucial moment of guideline 
advancement is tantamount to the Court neglecting its obligation to protect and support 
victims, witnesses, and those who are at risk on account of their work for or on behalf of 
the Court. 
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
¶9  Multiple provisions of Rome System texts affirm both that victims and others 
involved in the work of the Court have various rights and that the Court is the 
corresponding duty-bearer for those rights. In addition, the jurisprudence of the Court 
shows that rights can shift throughout a given procedure. While the Court’s duty to 
protect and support the psychosocial well-being of victims and intermediaries exists in 
the provisions of Rome System texts, the fact that rights and roles shift offers an 
additional reason to issue meaningful victim interview policies. 
                                                 
8
 International Refugee Rights Initiative and the Open Society Justice Initiative, Commentary on the ICC 
Draft Guidelines on Intermediaries, INT’L REFUGEE RTS. INITIATIVE 1, 16 (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.refugee-rights.org/Assets/PDFs/2011/iccintermediaries-commentary-20110818.pdf. 
9
 Id. at 21; but see Dranginis, supra note 3 (arguing that intermediaries generally know how to talk to 
traumatized individuals, and what they really need is payment for their services). 
10
 The author worked on the Guidelines and associated documents during his four-month assignment at the 
Court from January to May of 2012. The Guidelines were presented to the Assembly of States Parties in 
December 2012 at its eleventh assembly. 
11
 OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, INTERMEDIARIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
ROLE FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES 1 (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/intermediaries-
20111212/intermediaries-20111212.pdf (hereinafter “OSJI 2011 Report”). 
12
 The average number of participation applications received per month by the Court increased over 300% 
from 2010 to 2011. This number excludes both applications for reparations as well as representations made 
under Article 15. Though the data are not yet available for 2012, the number has not decreased. Interview 
with Soraya Birziki, Victims Participation and Reparations Section, International Criminal Court, in The 
Hague, Neth. (Mar. 28, 2012).   
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A.  Protection and Support for Victims 
¶10  The Rome System gives victims rights both at the investigation stage and at the 
trial stage. At the investigation stage, any person “[s]hall not be subjected to any form of 
coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”13 During the course of an investigation, the Prosecutor “shall . 
. . respect the interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses,”14 and 
“may” take necessary measures to ensure “the protection of any person.”15 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber (PTC) may, “[w]here necessary, provide for the protection and privacy of 
victims and witnesses” and “the protection of persons who have been arrested or 
appeared in response to a summons.”16 
¶11  At the trial stage, “[t]he Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and 
expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard 
for the protection of victims and witnesses.”17 The Trial Chamber (TC) also may 
“[p]rovide for the protection of the accused, witnesses and victims.”18 Most importantly 
with regard to the trial stage, article 68(1) of the Rome Statute (ICCSt) gives “the Court” 
the mandate to protect victims and witnesses:  
[t]he Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical 
and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and 
witnesses. In so doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, 
including [age, gender, health, and nature of the crime], in particular, but 
not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or 
violence against children. The Prosecutor shall take such measures 
particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes.19  
¶12  In addition, the ICCSt provides for a Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) within 
the Registry.20 The VWU “shall provide . . . counseling and other appropriate assistance 
for witnesses [and] victims who appear before the Court,”21 “shall . . . [assist victims and 
witnesses] in obtaining . . . psychological and other appropriate assistance,”22 and “shall . 
. . [make] available to the Court and the parties training in issues of trauma.”23 The 
greater a victim’s involvement with the Court, the greater the rights that victim acquires, 
and the greater the Court’s duties to respect and protect those rights. The Appeals 
Chamber has used primarily these statutory provisions to extend protection to non-
witnesses and non-victims, including intermediaries.24  
                                                 
13
 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court art. 55(1)(b) (Nov. 29, 2010) (hereinafter “ICCSt”).  
14
 Id. art. 54(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
15
 Id. art. 54(3)(f). 
16
 Id. art. 57(3)(c). 
17
 Id. art. 64(2). 
18
 Id. art. 64(6)(e). 
19
 Id. art. 68(1) (emphasis added). 
20
 Id. art. 43(6). 
21
 Id. art. 43(6). 
22
 INT’L CRIM. CT. R. P. EVID. 17(2)(a)(iii) (hereinafter “ICC RPE”). 
23
 ICC RPE 17(2)(a)(iv). 
24
 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution Request for 
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B.  Protection and Support for Intermediaries 
¶13  Texts in the Rome System do not specifically mention intermediaries. However, the 
texts do mention general classes of persons who may be put at risk on account of the 
Court’s activities, and the jurisprudence of the Court has found intermediaries to fall into 
this category. The question is then what rights intermediaries have at what point in the 
proceeding.  
¶14  In Katanga, the Appeals Chamber (AC) began the process of expanding protection 
to include intermediaries.  The issue first arose when the AC was asked to discern 
whether the Court could authorize non-disclosure to the Defense prior to trial of, among 
other things, the identities of intermediaries contained in witness statements.25 In keeping 
with equality of arms and a fair trial, the general principle is disclosure to the Defense of 
evidence that will be presented against defendants.26 As noted above, article 54(3)(f) of 
the Rome Statute permits the Prosecutor to “take necessary measures . . . to ensure . . . the 
protection of any person.”27 But the Rule that specifically addresses nondisclosure only 
allows the Chamber “to protect the safety of witnesses and victims and members of their 
families, including by authorizing the non-disclosure of their identities.”28 The 
intermediaries at issue thus did not fall within the Rule (victims, witnesses, and family 
members), but they did fall within the article (any person). The Appeals Chamber held 
that the Rule, Rule 81(4), “should be read to include the words ‘persons at risk on 
account of the activities of the Court’ so as to reflect the intention of the States that 
adopted the Statute and [RPEs] to protect people at risk.”29 
¶15  The AC found that intention in numerous provisions of the ICCSt and the RPE. 
Article 43(6) creates the VWU, which  
shall provide . . . protective measures and security arrangements, 
counseling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who 
appear before the Court, and others who are at risk on account of 
testimony given by such witnesses. The Unit shall include staff with 
expertise in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual 
violence.30   
¶16  Rules 16-18 of the RPE, detailing the affirmative duties of the Registrar and the 
VWU, each contain the phrase “others who are at risk on account of testimony given.”31 
Specifically with regard to the duties of the Registrar, she shall inform these other people 
of their rights and of the “existence, functions and availability” of the VWU, and ensure 
that they are aware of any decisions that affect their rights.32 The Registrar also may 
                                                                                                                                                 





 ICCSt arts. 61(3)(b), 61(6); ICC RPE 76(1), 76(4). 
27
 Id. art. 54(3)(f). 
28
 ICC RPE 81(4). 
29
 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, supra note 24, ¶ 56. 
30
 ICCSt art. 43(6) (emphasis added). 
31
 See Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, supra note 24, ¶ 50. 
32
 ICC RPE 16(2)(a)–(b). 
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negotiate “[a]greements on relocation and provision of support services on the territory of 
a State of traumatized or threatened victims, witnesses, and others who are at risk on 
account of testimony given by such witnesses.”33 The AC found that these provisions 
“are indicative of an overarching concern to ensure that persons are not unjustifiably 
exposed to risk through the activities of the Court.”34 
¶17  Duties of the VWU arising out of the RPE have similar reach. The mandate of the 
VWU extends to “all witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and others who are 
at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses.”35 For all of those persons, the 
VWU “shall” assist them in obtaining “psychological and other appropriate assistance.”36 
The VWU is also tasked with “[m]aking available to the Court and the parties training in 
issues of trauma.”37 Rule 87 affords protection to “another person at risk on account of 
testimony given by a witness,”38 and Rule 59(2) notes the Court’s duty regarding “the 
protection of any person.”39 
¶18  Partially relying on portions of the above reasoning, the Appeals Chamber held that 
“the States that adopted the Statute and the [RPE intended] to protect people at risk.”40 
The Court has upheld—and has never altered—the extension of protection to those “at 
risk on account of the activities of the Court.”41  Intermediaries are not barred from this 
protection. 
C.  Determining Victims and Those At Risk 
¶19  Determination of the appropriate level of protection and/or support begs the 
question of who is properly termed a victim, a witness, or an at risk person.  
¶20  Due to the asymmetry of information at different levels of trial, however, the 
standards for victim identification differ at the various phases of judicial proceedings.  
RPE 85(a) establishes the criteria for victimhood at the Court, whether one is a natural or 
juridical person.42 RPE 85(a) states that “‘[v]ictims’ means natural persons who have 
suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.”43 RPE 85(a) has been interpreted to comprise four elements, each of which must 
be satisfied to obtain the status of victim: the victim 1) must be a natural person who 2) 
                                                 
33
 Id. 16(4). 
34
 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, supra note 24, ¶ 54. 
35
 ICC RPE 17(2)(a). 
36
 Id. 17(2)(a)(iii). 
37
 Id. 17(2)(a)(iv). 
38
 Id. 87(1). 
39
 Id. 59(2). 
40
 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, supra note 24, ¶ 56. 
41
 See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2582, Judgment on the appeal of 
the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled “Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 
or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU”, ¶ 50 n. 117 (Oct. 8, 
2010) (“Although in this appeal the intermediary is neither a victim nor a witness, the Appeals Chamber 
has previously held that other persons at risk may be considered to fit within the framework established for 
such protection.”). 
42
 See ICC RPE 85(b) (stating that “victims may include organizations or institutions”). 
43
 Id. 85(a). 
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suffered harm that was 3) caused by actions that 4) make up a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.44 
¶21  Prior to the issuance of an indictment, though, it is impossible to know with 
certainty whether the actions make up any particular crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Indeed, that is precisely what the PTC determines when deciding whether or not 
an indictment is merited. Accordingly, when a person applies for victim status at the 
preliminary stages of the proceedings, the Court will use the same burden of proof for 
victimhood that it uses to grant procedural rights to those under investigation by the OTP. 
That is, the ICCSt article 55(2) “grounds to believe” standard will be used to determine if 
the victims has met the four requirements in ICC RPE 85(a).45 The Court has significant 
discretion in making this determination.46   
¶22  At the arrest warrant stage, the burden becomes “reasonable grounds to believe.”47  
After that, at the confirmation of charges hearing, the PTC may very well decide that 
some or all charges cannot be confirmed against some or all of the accused.48 In this third 
test of the Prosecution’s evidence, the standard is “substantial grounds to believe” a 
person has committed a specific crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.49 When the 
Prosecutor does not present evidence to meet this higher bar, the PTC does not confirm 
that charge against the accused. When that happens, victims whose participation was 
granted based on the unconfirmed crime become non-victims, at least before the Court 
itself.50 
¶23  Victims can lose their status in other ways, too. For example, if at any point in the 
trial new evidence emerges that invalidates the grounds upon which a victim’s 
application was granted, victim status can be revoked.51 In its first decision on principles 
to be applied in reparations proceedings, Trial Chamber I held that the “balance of 
probabilities”52 (akin to the U.S. “preponderance of the evidence”53) standard should 
                                                 
44
 See ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Decision on the 
Applications for participation in the proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 
6 (Public Redacted Version), ¶ 79 (Jan. 17, 2006). It should be noted that some ICC judges combine 
elements two and three. See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gagbo, ICC-01/11-01/11-384-Corr, 
Corrigendum to the Second Decision on Victims’ Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and 
in the Related Proceedings, ¶ 24 (Feb. 6, 2013). 
45
 See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, ¶¶ 99–100, supra note 
44. 
46
 See Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-101, Decision on victims’ applications for participation a/0010/06, 
a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ¶13 (Aug. 10, 2007). 
47
 ICCSt art. 58. 
48
 See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Matthieu Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, Judgment pursuant to article 
74 of the Statute (Dec. 18, 2012); ICC, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and 
Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012); ICC, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012); ICC, Prosecutor v. Callixte 
Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the confirmation of charges (Dec. 16, 2011). 
49
 ICCSt art. 61(5). 
50
 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-933-tENG, Decision on the treatment of applications for 
participation, ¶ 11 (Feb. 26, 2009). 
51
 Id. ¶ 12. 
52
 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/06-01/08-2904, Decision establishing the principles 
and procedures to be applied to reparations, ¶ 253 (Aug. 7, 2012). 
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apply to victims attempting to prove their victimhood. It is difficult—but not 
impossible—to imagine a situation in which a victim met the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard at the trial phase but then could not meet the “balance of probabilities” 
standard at the reparations phase. Evidence spoliation comes to mind.  However, the mere 
fact that there is a bar at all for individuals who already made it through the entire trial as 
victims is quite telling. One’s status as a victim in front of the Court is always in 
question. 
¶24  On the other hand, it appears that the test for whether someone is “at risk on 
account of the activities of the Court” does not change throughout proceedings. The 
Court has held—albeit only at the Trial Chamber level54—that the test the VWU shall 
apply is whether, following careful investigation, a witness “faces an established danger 
of harm or death.”55 While not explicitly endorsing a standard of proof, the TC clarified 
that “protection shall be afforded to any witness, following careful investigation, if he or 
she is exposed to (“faces”) an evidence-based (“established”) danger of harm or death.”56 
The Court went on to state: “an established danger of harm can include physical as well 
as psychological harm.”57 
III.   SYSTEMS IN PLACE 
A.  Victim Trauma Arrangements 
¶25  The Court understands its duties to victims, witnesses, and those at risk on account 
of the work of the Court. Between the VWU, the Public Information and Documentation 
Section (PIDS), the Victim Participation and Reparation Section (VPRS), the Office of 
Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV), and the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), the Rome 
System provides specialized avenues for engagement with victims and is now 
implementing its second strategy in relation to victims.  Like the Intermediary 
Guidelines, the author worked on this Revised Strategy58 during his time at the Court.   
¶26  The OTP is usually the first organ of the Court to interact with victims. The OTP 
has set up a separate unit—the Protection Strategies Unit (PSU)—to facilitate and be the 
focal point for contact with the VWU.59 The OTP also contains the OTP Gender and 
Children Unit (GCU). Vedrana Mladina, who has a Ph.D. in clinical psychology, was the 
first appointee to the GCU.
60
 Mladina has created a significant system of guidelines and 
                                                                                                                                                 
53
 See id. ¶ 253 n. 439 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary in describing “balance of the probabilities” as 
“sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other”). 
54
 ICC Trial Chamber decisions are not binding on other chambers. 
55
 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/06-01/08-1557, Decision on the prosecution and 
defence applications for leave to appeal the Trial Chamber’s “Decision on Disclosure Issues, 
Responsibilities for Protective Measures and other Procedural Matters”, ¶ 27 (Dec. 16, 2008). 
56
 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
57
 Id. ¶ 29. 
58
 ICC, Court’s revised strategy in relation to victims, ICC-ASP-11/38 (Nov. 5, 2012). 
59
 The PSU’s existence is only publicly evidenced in job announcements. See, e.g., Team Leader, EUROPA 
NU, http://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vii360ztzjyr/team_leader; Protection Strategies Assistant, EUROPEAN 
INFORMATION AND RESEARCH NETWORK ON PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, 
http://euparl.net/9353000/1/j9vvhskmycle0vf/vig68l9lv7zt. 
60
 Interview with Vedrana Mladina, Associate Victims Expert, Gender and Children Unit, Office of the 
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, in The Hague, Neth. (Feb. 27, 2012). 
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protection and support measures for the OTP.
61
 Some of the materials that make up the 
OTP arsenal include:  
 guidelines for interviewing victims of SGBV; 
 guidelines for interviewing children; 
 a child-friendly court introduction; 
 the “dos and don’ts” for interviewing victims of SGBV and 
children;  
 a “very detailed” questionnaire to assess SGBV; 
 portions of the “OTP Manual” (nicknamed, “The Bible”) that 
address interviewing; and 
 a lessons learned document that was compiled by an “honest and 
open” review of their work with victims.
62
 
¶27  The one bit of information about the interview process Mladina could reveal was 
that, in the interview process, “everything starts with free narrative.”
63
 As is typical in the 
field, they generally endorse the “cognitive interview” model, which is discussed in 
Section III below.
64
   
¶28  On top of the available materials listed above, Mladina facilitates special trainings 
for OTP staff members on such topics as how to interview victims of SGBV and how to 
examine children and SGBV victims in court.
65
 She also teaches a module on 
psychosocial aspects of interviewing at the Institute for International Criminal 
Investigations.
66
 Thus, the Organ of the Court that typically has the first interview with 
victims—after they are put in touch through an intermediary—seems to have robust 
measures in place to ensure that interviewing traumatized individuals proceeds in a 
measured and safe way. 
¶29  If testimony may compromise a victim, the OTP does not continue with that victim. 
That is, if the psychosocial assessment done by Mladina or her colleagues evidences that 
the victim would not be able to testify without further damaging effects, she does not let 
the OTP continue with that victim. Perhaps remarkably, the OTP listens. “The position of 
the [former] Prosecutor—and I assume the [current] Prosecutor will adhere to this—has 




¶30  After a victim is chosen to be a witness, they are handed over to the VWU. The 
VWU performs its own assessments and “[i]n some cases the VWU is provided with 
                                                 
61
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medical records by external health care professionals concerning the witness within the 
VWU’s care.”68 The VWU also works with the OTP PSU and requests specific 
information from the GCU as appropriate (such as family history and medical history, 
which the OTP already would have collected).69 However, because the VWU and the 
OTP are completely independent and have very good reasons not to share information,70 
information flow is not as fluid as it might be in other organizations. 
¶31  When the VWU deems it appropriate, it can request special measures to protect the 
psychological well-being of victims. To do so, the Chambers and the VWU have 
established a vulnerability protocol.71 The protocol includes optional measures such as 
starting testimony with a free narrative phase and following the pace of the witness.72 
Thus, like the OTP, the VWU has a system of assessments and victim care that is 
significantly developed. 
¶32  The unit that perhaps has the most interaction with victims who must tell their 
stories is the VPRS. Because VPRS is primarily responsible for filling out victim 
applications, workers and intermediaries from this unit have significant interaction with 
victim narratives.73 These applications come from thousands of victims who seek to be 
recognized as victims under Rule 85, to participate in the proceedings under article 68, or 
to be considered for reparations under article 75. 
¶33  As of mid-2012, VPRS had five field posts in total. VPRS sometimes trains 
intermediaries so they can more effectively fill out applications.74 On occasions when 
VPRS is ordered to contact large numbers of victims themselves, they hire a consultant to 
prepare a methodology for a particular series of interviews.75 In the past, they have also 
asked VWU for help.76 When VPRS hires consultants, the resulting training packages 
become part of the resources of the unit. In that sense, VPRS has interviewing guidelines 
at their disposal. 
B.  Widespread Use of Intermediaries Increases Potential for Intermediary Trauma 
¶34  As elucidated in the Guidelines and recognized by all who work at the Court, 
intermediaries come in many flavors.77 There are those chosen by the Court, there are 
those chosen by victims, and there are those who self-appoint. Intermediaries—even a 
single intermediary—can work with multiple organs and units of the Court and Counsel. 
Mostly, these include those organs and units mentioned above: the OTP, the OPCV, the 
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VPRS, the PIDS, the TFV, and defense counsel. The VWU, it deserves noting, does not 
use intermediaries.  
¶35  During the preliminary examination and investigation phases, intermediaries 
ideally act only as the link between the OTP and the victims. In this capacity, they 
connect the OTP to potential witnesses and/or sources of evidence. Again, in an ideal 
world, the OTP would then be in touch with the victim directly to start the process of 
evidence collection. 
¶36  As the Trial Chamber found in both Lubanga78 and Ngudjolo,79 that is not what 
happens. Instead, as a defense consultant at the ICC put it, the OTP outsources a great 
deal of its investigations.80   
¶37  Having intermediaries investigate is problematic for a number of reasons.81 First, 
while intermediaries may help and assist, “they should not be called upon to undertake 
the core functions of the Court.”82  Investigating is a core function of the OTP. Second, 
this method of evidence is rife with quality and neutrality concerns.83 But most 
importantly for this analysis, it exposes intermediaries and victims to the risks of 
vicarious traumatization and retraumatization, respectively. 
¶38  The Guidelines recognize that exposing intermediaries to close victim interaction 
also potentially exposes them to trauma, whether or not the intermediaries are 
investigating. It deals with supporting traumatized intermediaries in section 4.5, stating, 
“the Court will, where appropriate, provide referrals to local organizations that provide 
psychological care and support.”84   
¶39  The IRRI/OSJI commentary on this section of the Guidelines is worth relaying here 
in toto:  
During the consultations in drafting this Commentary, the need for 
psycho-social care for intermediaries working with victims and witnesses 
was particularly emphasized as a matter that appears to be 
underappreciated to date. Due to the multiple threats to which 
intermediaries may be exposed, in addition to stresses and responsibilities 
created by interacting with victims and witnesses, intermediaries are often 
acutely in need of psychosocial care and support. While welcoming the 
ICC’s recognition of the referral role of the ICC, we would suggest in 
appropriate cases, e.g. where such provision goes to the heart of the 
effective and safe completion of the requested intermediary task itself or 
where the intermediary has suffered or is likely to suffer significant 
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psychological harm as a result of fulfilling the tasks assigned to him/her 
by the ICC, that such care be provided for directly by the ICC.85 
¶40  In addition to the IRRI/OSJI Commentary, the Victims’ Rights Working Group 
(VRWG) also published a report on outstanding issues in the ICC’s Draft Guidelines. The 
VRWG’s report couched its recommendations, like this article, in the obligations of the 
Court under its Statute: “some identified categories of intermediaries should 
automatically receive training on preventative protection and basic trauma awareness in 
view of the Court’s obligation to protect victims under Article 68(1) of the Statute.”86 The 
VRWG went on to suggest in-house training and training manuals that address 
“techniques and methodologies for carrying out various tasks in which intermediaries are 
engaged.”87 Interviewing trauma survivors is one such task. 
IV.   THE TRAUMA OF TRAUMA INTERVIEWING 
¶41  There are myriad methods used to analyze the effects of testimony. While these 
methods use different terminology and formulate their respective analyses based on 
different theoretical underpinnings, all methods point to the same conclusion: 
interviewing can be helpful and hurtful.  
A.  Narrative Theory 
¶42  In narrative theory, human beings create meaning through narrative.88 Practitioners 
of social constructivist psychology,89 narrative medicine,90 and other fields91 who follow 
this school of thought assert that past events and experiences do not merely exist in an 
ether of disconnected memories, but are contextualized—narrativized—to give meaning 
to the overall arch of one’s life. That overall arch can vary depending on one’s outlook. 
For example, the same traumatic past can leave one feeling victimized, hopeful for a 
brighter future, both, or neither. Whatever the story line or particular facts, a narrative 
creates coherence.92 
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¶43  Psychiatrist Dori Laub has published widely on massive psychic trauma and 
survivor testimony.93  Laub, a member of the narrative theory school, believes 
psychological trauma’s main affect can be described as a fracture of one’s narrative.94 
Others who have studied survivor testimony have come to similar conclusions.95 
¶44  According to Laub et al., the traumatic moment is an incongruous exception to the 
linear structure of one’s internal life story. In short, it is de-narrativized. By telling one’s 
story to another human being, the speaker is able to build bridges across disparate stored 
events. In this way, autobiographical interviews can allow one to go “from 
speechlessness to narrative,”96 thereby situating this type of interview as an important 
tool within the holistic toolkit for healing the survivors’ “shattered” lives.97 
1. Witnessing 
¶45  Traumatic events are de-narrativized because, Laub asserts, human beings who 
witness a man-made traumatic event, including most of what would qualify as genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes,98 witness the collapse of human community. In 
the human community, Person A should never do that thing to Person B. When Person B 
cries for her very life, Person A should stop and listen. But Person A does not. 
¶46  Under an Object-Relations theory, the victim’s unheeded cries for help cause the 
victim to “reexperienc[e] the earliest childhood imagery of fantasized horrors of 
helplessness, worthlessness, and castration.”99 The trauma of witnessing this act, whether 
as victim or bystander, becomes “unspeakable and unrepresentable and . . . marked by 
forgetting and dissociation.”100 For the witness to these crimes, there simply is “no 
empathic companion who is willing to listen and respond to one’s needs.”101 
¶47  The traumatic event becomes “an ‘absent’ experience because at the core of the 
executioner-victim interaction all human relatedness is undone.”102 The story of the 
traumatic event is “never known, told, or remembered. . . . No perception of the event is 
                                                 
93
 See, e.g., Dori Laub, From Speechlessness to Narrative: The Cases of Holocaust Historians and of 
Psychiatrically Hospitalized Survivors, 24 LITERATURE AND MEDICINE 253 (2005); see also KIM 
WORTHINGTON, SELF AS NARRATIVE (1996); Allesandro Portelli, What Makes Oral History Different, in 
THE DEATH OF LUIGI TRASTULLI AND OTHER STORIES: FORM AND MEANING IN ORAL HISTORY (1991); 
Mary Marshall Clark, Holocaust Video Testimony, Oral History, and Narrative Medicine: The Struggle 
against Indifference, 24 LITERATURE AND MEDICINE 266 (2005). 
94
 See Laub, supra note 93. 
95
 See, e.g., Nanette C. Auerhahn & Dori Laub, Annihilation and Restoration: Post-Traumatic Memory as 
Pathway and Obstacle to Recovery, 11 INT’L REV. OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 327 (1984); Stevan Weine & Dori 
Laub, Narrative Constructions of Historical Realities in Testimony with Bosnian Survivors of “Ethnic 
Cleansing”, 58 PSYCHIATRY: INTERPERSONAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 246 (1995). 
96
 See Laub, supra note 93. 
97
 See Dori Laub, Introduction to the English-Language Edition: Survivors’ Silence and the Difficulty of 
Knowing, in AT THE SIDE OF TORTURE SURVIVORS: TREATING A TERRIBLE ASSAULT ON HUMAN DIGNITY 
xv, xxi (Sepp Graessner, M.D., Norbert Gurris & Christian Pross, M.D. eds., 2001). 
98
 These three crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the Court per ICCSt article 5. 
99
 Laub, supra note 97. 
100




 Dori Laub, Breaking the Silence of the Muted Witness: Video Testimonies of Psychiatrically 
Hospitalized Holocaust Survivors in Israel, in LESSONS AND LEGACIES VIII: FROM GENERATION TO 
GENERATION 175, 178 (Doris L. Bergen ed., 2008). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [2012 
 118
translated into symbolizing words; no narrative is formed.  In a very important sense,” 
Laub writes, “the event has not yet been experienced.”103 What is left is a memory 
without a narrative, an event without meaning, a human being without a community.  
PTSD results. 
2. First Witnessing  
¶48  Because the event has not yet been experienced, the interview setting provides 
fertile ground for narrativizing and creating meaning out of the event for the first time. As 
Laub explains:  
What the giving and receiving of testimony does is to set in motion a 
dyadic-dialogic process. The listener-companion, in his or her total 
presence, offers the possibility and the protected holding space, within 
which the internal other, or Thou, can be reestablished, necessary to face 
the traumatic event. The story is told both to the listener and to oneself, 
and the process of narrativization unfolds.104 
¶49  The interviewer, by actively listening and thereby taking part in the process of 
meaning creation, does not merely record the testimony of the witness to the traumatic 
event. Rather, she herself becomes a “first witness” to the event. The interviewee literally 
re-lives the event as the interviewer watches and listens. 
¶50  Laub’s paper, “From Speechlessness to Narrative,” contained findings of 
interviews with twenty-six chronically hospitalized Holocaust survivors.105 Each 
interview was between one-and-a-half and two-and-a-half hours long. Extensive 
psychological testing was performed both before and five months after the interviews. 
Interviewed individuals showed a decrease of PTSD symptoms “of close to 50 percent. A 
control group of survivors who had not given testimony showed no decrease of such post-
traumatic symptoms after the five-month interval. After this group also gave testimony, 
[Laub] saw the same results.”106 
¶51  This experiment demonstrates the potential for the positive impact of interviews on 
interviewees. Studies specific to giving legal testimony, including some specific to war 
crimes tribunals, have found the same potential for positive effects of giving testimony.107 
3. Caveant Orator et Auditor 
¶52  Those same studies and others point also to the possible negative effects of giving 
testimony, both for the speaker and the listener. In a Canadian study of survivors of 
childhood sexual abuse, all ninety-three participants responded that giving testimony 
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“disrupted lives and relationships . . . [causing] nausea and vomiting, as well as 
psychological distress.”108 Two studies of women who gave testimony in Rwandan 
domestic Gacaca courts found that the experience had the potential to cause trauma.109 
Countless other studies found the same result.110 
¶53  In addition, it was not uncommon for emotions “stirred up” during the course of 
giving testimony to continue to affect the witness after the trial.111 Studies outside of 
giving legal testimony also demonstrate the possibility for negative impact of interviews 
on interviewees.112 Still other studies have found that a neutral-impact interview may not 
exist, at least from the interviewee’s perspective.113 That is, an investigatory interview 
can be positive or negative, but not neutral. 
¶54  The effect on the interviewer—the First Witness—is also significant. 
Vicarious/Secondary Traumatization is widely recognized in the psychological literature 
on trauma interviewers. While “Vicarious Traumatization” was initially coined with 
reference to psychotherapists who worked with trauma survivors,114 other studies have 
extended the concept’s application to virtually all persons who assist and work with 
trauma survivors. These individuals include healthcare providers,115 journalists,116 first 
responders,117 clergy,118 and, most relevant to this study, attorneys,119 humanitarian 
workers,120 and other professionals within the justice system.121  
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¶55  Laub himself recognized the countertransference of the interviewer. Laub 
experienced “vicarious traumatization through witnessing to an instance of genocide” 
which caused a “loss of coherent speech.”122 Joan Lansen, another trauma psychologist, 
described the countertransference and gave reasons why it is more prone to happen in 
atrocity crime situations:  
all intensive work with “man-made disasters” (when humans are 
tormented by human hand) . . . requires very personal participation by the 
therapist . . . . Naturally, this work does something to us. It can deprive us 
of our sleep, and it can cause burnout. It can influence our behavior at 
home and among colleagues; it can turn us into annoying people. We can 
develop the same symptoms as our patients: tension, depression, and 
severe anxiety.123 
C.  Neuroscience 
¶56  Neuroscience provides a “harder” explanation for the salience of trauma 
interviews.124 That explanation starts out by noting that memory and stress are intimately 
interrelated, as first recognized by Yerkes and Dodson.125 
¶57  The Yerkes-Dodson law shows that some stress is good for memory, while too 
much stress impedes it.126 The physiological reason is widely thought to involve 
glucocorticoids, which are released by the basal ganglia upon encountering a stressor.127 
Too many glucocorticoids can effectively paralyze the hippocampus.128 
¶58  The hippocampus is responsible for working memory and binding/consolidating 
working memories into long-term episodic memories.129 Episodic memories are those 
autobiographical memories in which we remember ourselves participating in activities.130 
When the hippocampus is paralyzed by an overflow of glucocorticoids, working memory 
is impeded, and disparate events are not bound together into coherent episodic 
memories.131 
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¶59  The amygdala, however, thrives in situations of increased glucocorticoid 
concentration.132 The amygdala is the part of the brain largely responsible for processing 
memory and causing immediate emotional reactions.133 It also stores heightened 
emotional memories.134  Metcalfe and Jacobs have called this the “hot” memory system, 
where the hippocampus-based memory system is the “cool” one.135 
¶60  Unfortunately, the amygdala is very bad at binding memories together.136 This 
deficiency accounts for the “weapon focus” of those who experience the trauma of being 
mugged at gunpoint: individuals can remember very clearly and accurately the gun, but 
their attention is focused and their memory of other aspects of the situation (say, height 
and weight of the shooter) is severely impaired.137 Thus, for a victim of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the court (or any other trauma), heightened glucocorticoid concentration 
will likely have led to ineffective binding of memories and a resulting fracture in the 
victim’s narrative memory. In those cases, the memory will actually reside in another part 
of the brain—that is bad at binding. 
¶61  Neuroscience has only begun to study the effects of narrativizing one’s traumatic 
memories. Preliminary research, however, shows that the way an interviewee is asked to 
relay events can have an effect on the extent of their amygdala activation.138 Of course, it 
is well accepted in cognitive behaviorism that that prolonged exposure to a stressor can 
reduce the response to that stressor,139 so the key is finding a stressor that is not overly 
burdensome at every exposure.  Crucially in this regard, the preliminary research 
mentioned above found that asking victims of trauma to go straight into talking about the 
trauma caused the same neurological signals as the trauma itself.140 
D.  Investigative Interviewing  
¶62  Trauma’s effect on narrative (and vice versa) has not gone unnoticed in the 
investigative interviewing field, either. After lamenting the lack of interview training and 
theory for investigators, Fisher and Geiselman developed the cognitive interview in the 
early 1980s.141 The immediate goal was to create a style of interviewing that would assist 
and enhance recall.142   
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¶63  The “cognitive interview” developed into the “enhanced cognitive interview,” 
which was, in turn, adapted into the “spaced cognitive interview”143 (SCI) for victims 
who showed “anxiety-hindered narration.”144 The hindrance, as recognized by 
investigative interviewers, is due to trauma confronted at each attempt to talk about the 
stressful memory.145 
¶64  SCI deals with confrontation of trauma by spacing out narration. The spacing 
allows the victim to confront the stressor for a prolonged period of time in a supportive 
environment.146 It encourages establishing rapport and asking open-ended questions. By 
doing so, SCI operationalizes the cognitive behaviorism theory that psychological re-
experience through a narrative structure reduces the anxiety that originates from 
traumatic experiences.147 
¶65  Many studies have been done on SCI to establish whether or not it indeed reduces 
the anxiety originating from traumatic events. These studies found that the perceived 
amount of respect an interviewer has for an interviewee has a strong effect on ability and 
willingness to recall.148 As one victim put it:  
It was easier for me to talk to people who acted properly because people 
who interview people, they should not punish you, but they can do so just 
by their way of talking, showing their hate for me as a human being, and 
at that moment you turn around and return their hate.149  
¶66  This quote shows both the positive and the negative effects of establishing rapport 
on the attitude of the interviewee and the interviewee’s subsequent desire (and maybe 
even ability) to recall. 
¶67  In an attempt to empirically establish the utility of the cognitive interview, 
researchers created experiments150 based on Antonovsky’s concept of “sense of 
coherence” (SOC).151 According to Antonovsky, one’s SOC comprises three different 
feelings: comprehensibility, manageability, and meaningfulness.152 Holmberg elaborates 
on these three feelings:  
[t]he first, the cognitive component comprehensibility, refers to the degree 
to which individuals perceive information, about themselves and the 
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environment, as structured, predictable and comprehensible. The second 
instrumental component, manageability, refers to whether individuals 
perceive their personal and social resources as sufficient to cope with 
demands posed by internal and external stimuli. The third motivational 
component, meaningfulness, is the emotional counterpart of 
comprehensibility; it refers to how individuals feel that their lives make 
sense emotionally and to the extent that they perceive stressful experiences 
as requiring them to invest time, energy and effort.153 
¶68  Researchers in this study showed that individuals who experienced a 
“humanitarian” police interview—one containing open-ended questions and in which 
rapport was established—had a higher SOC than those who felt themselves less respected 
by the police.154 Another study of eighty-three crime victims also found that victims who 
“perceived a high humanitarian approach from their police interviewer reported a 
significantly higher SOC than those who perceived a low humanitarian approach.”155 
While these studies can show only correlation and not causality, the correlation is clear: 
interviewing correlates with emotional response.   
¶69  Some victims may even value proper treatment more than a guilty verdict.  The 
seminal study in this field assessed whether victims were more concerned with “decision 
control” or “process control,”
 
and ended up finding the latter.
 
156  In the study, “decision 
control” related to the control a victim had over the outcome of the trial, and “process 
control” related to the control a victim had over the judicial process, whatever the 
outcome of that process might turn out to be.  The data indicated that victims were 
willing to forego decision control if it meant they retained process control.   
¶70  Subsequent studies corroborated this finding, reinforcing the theory that 
“procedural justice” is often more important to victims than “distributive justice.”157  The 
importance of procedural justice makes sense, given that victims often have no ability to 
measure their distributive outcome against the outcome of others.158  Even without any 
information about others, victims can always measure how they have been treated 
throughout their own judicial process.159  
¶71  But while judging distributive justice is fairly easy, judging procedural justice is 
not so easy, at least at first glance.  If a victim loses a goat, and the judicial process that 
convicts a person then orders that person to give the victim a goat or the money to buy a 
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replacement goat, that just seems fair.160  More fundamentally, because the outcomes of 
distributive justice—the distributions themselves—are generally either black and white 
(conviction/acquittal) or monetizable (how much money the victim receives), judging 
that type of justice is usually straightforward.   
¶72  Judging procedural justice is less straightforward.  Generally, research shows that, 
in order for victims to perceive their respective procedures as fair, they want:   
 to be treated with dignity and respect; 
 to be notified about important developments and informed about 
their rights; 
 to receive victim support; 
 to receive protection from the accused; 
 to attend and participate in proceedings in order to have their 
voices heard; 
 to receive reparation; and  
 to receive legal assistance.161 
¶73  The ICC’s participation and reparation regime, coupled with the cognitive 
interview, has the potential to offer all of the above. Moreover, since victims can become 
non-victims throughout proceedings, thus becoming ineligible for distributive justice, 
procedural justice at the ICC is that much more important.  
V.   FROM HERE TO THERE 
¶74  The primary goal in this area should be to do as those at risk asked the Court to do: 
to help them understanding how to work with traumatized individuals.  The ICC has a 
number of different options in this respect, even within the typical budgetary and 
logistical constraints.   
¶75  Other educational products made available by the Court evidence that some options 
revolve around the PIDS, the VWU, and the OTP GCU getting together and creating 
guidelines, a protocol, standards, pamphlets, videos, or similar instruments.  The Court 
already utilizes multiple digital and physical outreach devices, including a YouTube 
video on “Being a Witness.”162 Between the work of the VWU and OTP staff, a best-
practices guide for interviewing traumatized individuals that is already sanctioned by at 
least one unit or organ of the Court must exist.  The PIDS could then create a video based 
on the document(s), or simply put the document(s) online. Alternatively, the PIDS could 
physically publish a single document as it did with its “Understanding the ICC” 
pamphlet.   
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¶76  Training sessions for intermediaries are also an option. It is not uncommon for 
intermediaries to be trained after they are identified. What is uncommon is for them to be 
trained in interviewing traumatized individuals. Indeed, it is unprecedented as far as the 
author can tell.163 Of course, training sessions and online or physical material are not 
mutually exclusive options. 
¶77  If creation of a best-practices manual is not a viable option, then the Court should 
at least point intermediaries to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring164 or the Istanbul Protocol.165 Both of 
these documents recognize retraumatization and vicarious traumatization and contain 
suggestions for coping.166 Another idea is to partner with an outside party—an education 
or service institution, perhaps—to work alongside intermediaries and help them do the 
Court’s hard work. 
¶78  At the end of the day, the Court has made important advancements in protecting 
and supporting victims, witnesses, intermediaries, and others who put themselves at risk 
in order to advance the mission of international criminal justice. At this crucial stage of 
guideline and strategy promulgation, the Court should take very seriously the results of 
the expansive consultation process in which it engaged with regard to the Intermediary 
Guidelines. Intermediaries are asking for help right now.  To the extent possible within 
available resources, the Court should support those who are suffering and who may suffer 
by offering guidelines for interviewing individuals whose narratives have been fractured 
by trauma. 
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